How PH presidents defended or sold the nation's rights in West Philippine Sea

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Lee
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IN the span of 38 years, counting from the EDSA revolt in 1986 and the overthrow of the senior President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the republic has been led and served by seven presidents.

Each president, in their respective ways, maintained relations with China. And each got different degrees of deference and support from Beijing, as China's paramount leader at the time would allow.

There is a significant episode in the "One News PH" podcast of Professor Richard Heydarian that merits study because of the light it casts on the conduct of relations with China. The podcast features a long conversation between Heydarian and former Supreme Court associate justice Antonio Carpio, and they specifically discuss the contrasting policies and records of Filipino presidents in dealing with China, from President Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998) to our present commander in chief Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

Justice Carpio has been very visible since his retirement from the high court because of his active involvement in public issues. He has been particularly prominent in advocating a stronger and firmer stand against China's bullying and gray tactics against Filipinos and fishermen in the South China Sea, particularly in the country's exclusive economic zone.

I managed to gather together a full transcript of their conversation, and I want to reproduce here some excerpts because of some significant disclosures made by Justice Carpio.

Heydarian: Can you quickly remind everyone how you got so involved in the West Philippine Sea issues and the South China Sea dispute?

Carpio: I was the chief presidential legal counsel of former President Fidel V. Ramos, and I was in Malacañang when China seized Mischief Reef in end 1995 and early 1996, and we really didn't know what to do at that time. We had ratified Unclos [the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea], but China had not yet ratified it. So we could not sue China before an Unclos tribunal, and, of course, we had just shut down the American military bases just two years before, and the Americans were not around anymore, so we had to face China alone, and of course, when the Americans left, there was a power vacuum in the South China Sea and whenever there is a power vacuum the next power will rush in. That's why China seized Mischief Reef soon after the Americans left, and we couldn't do anything as China took part of our exclusive economic zone (EEZ). We sent an old Philippine Navy ship to bring local and foreign journalists to Mischief Reef, but the ship conked out before reaching the reef. It was really very sad; we didn't know what to do; we couldn't go to the Unclos tribunal because China had not yet ratified the treaty. China's violation of our sovereign rights became a fait accompli (an accomplished fact).

It was striking that China took Mischief Reef from us at a time when a four-star general and former AFP chief of staff was the president of the Philippines — President Fidel V. Ramos, who had with him at the Palace some of his top-ranked military colleagues as close advisers or members of his government. China moved against the republic with little concern about untoward consequences.

The loss of Mischief Reef was a psychological shock to us in Malacañang; it reminded us of our extreme vulnerability. President Ramos was someone extremely adept in matters of defense and foreign affairs.

What was most striking at the time was the lack of anticipation on our part and then the lack of capacity to do something about China's aggressive action.

It did not occur to our policymakers and leaders then that China would fill the vacuum left after the American bases were closed down.

I cannot blame our senators for not ratifying the proposed renewal of the military bases agreement with the US, but our senators ought to have foreseen that once the US left Subic and Clark, there would be a vacuum in the South China Sea. We should have prepared for that before we kicked out our allies from the air bases and naval bases in the Philippines.

Turning point

The turning point was really Scarborough Shoal. It's not like we didn't try to find a legal or political arrangement with China. If you look at the Arroyo administration, there was the JMSU (Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking); there were all sorts of different projects that the Arroyo administration was pursuing. That should also have served as a kind of wake-up call about the limits of diplomacy with China. I know the history; the Chinese offered to give us a huge loan for the North Rail and the national broadband, yeah, NBN-ZTE. But they demanded that we sign the JMSU, so there was a quid pro quo because the JMSU would allow them to survey even our territorial sea, which is crazy, wow! So that's why when they surveyed the Reed Bank, they knew that there was a lot of gas in Reed Bank; that's why they didn't want us to go to Reed Bank. We were fooled willfully, or we were fooled because of our naivete, or because we wanted to get the investment or the jumbo loan that was supposed to be for the national broadband network, which, as you know, was drenched in corruption. The North Rail, because of corruption, was not finished. We had to terminate it, and China sued us in Hong Kong for arbitration, and we had to pay China for everything. You look at North Rail; you can see those posts; there's nothing; not even a meter of railroad was built, only those posts because the mobilization fee was pocketed by someone, and the Chinese demanded more mobilization, but the CoA refused. The rot was at the core of the apple of diplomatic engagement with China.

When he had a meeting with China at the Asean [summit] in Cambodia, President Aquino III was told by the Chinese vice premier that their coast guard vessels at Scarborough would stay there permanently. President Aquino had to make a decision because that was an invasion already. Yeah, that's a territory of the Philippines. When he came back to Manila, he called [Foreign] Secretary [Albert] del Rosario, and they decided to sue China one month later.

The worst of times

Just a month or so into President Duterte's term in office, yes, it was really the worst of times because here we were fighting China defending the West Philippine Sea, and Duterte was defending China, lawyering for them, lawyering for China, he was the agent of China. Early in his administration, he made a verbal order to the Navy: patrol only the territorial sea; do not go beyond the territorial sea. That means give the, essentially yeah, give the West Philippine Sea, our exclusive economic zone to China. But the Constitution says the state shall protect its marine wealth in its exclusive economic zone and reserve the wealth there exclusively for the benefit of Filipinos. Yet he said to patrol only the territorial sea, and later on, he said, 'I allowed China to fish in our exclusive economic zone.' That's terrible; he really violated the Constitution. Here was our president doing the wishes of China. It was really the worst of times for us.

yenobserver@gmail.com

 

How PH presidents defended or sold the nation's rights in West Philippine Sea

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Lee1154
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Good summary.  Even though as expats we have to stay out of the local politics, we should pay attention to what is going on in the neighborhood.

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